T -Payoff for defecting on a cooperator R -Payoff for mutual cooperation P -Payoff for mutual defection S -Payoff for cooperating with a defector
Introduction
Cooperation has played a key role throughout evolution (1) . Self-replicating cells have cooperated to form multi-cellular organisms throughout evolutionary history (2, 3) . Similarly, we know that animals cooperate in families to raise their offsprings and in groups, to prey as well as to reduce the risk of predation (4, 5) . Cooperation has been conveniently formulated in the framework of evolutionary game theory which, when combined with games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma game, used as a metaphor for studying cooperation between unrelated individuals, enables one to investigate how collective cooperative behaviour may survive in a world where individual selfish actions produce better short-term results.
Analytical solutions for this problem have been obtained whenever populations are assumed infinite and their interactions homogeneous, such that all individuals are in equivalent positions. Under such assumptions, non-cooperative behaviour prevails. Such an unfavourable scenario for cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, together with the difficulty in ranking the actual payoffs in field and experimental work (6, 7) has lead to the adoption of other games (8, 9) , such as the Snowdrift game (also known as Hawk-Dove game or Chicken, which is more favourable to cooperation), and the Stag-Hunt game (10) , as well as to numerical studies of cooperation in finite, spatially structured populations (11) , in which homogeneity is still retained. Such studies of the role of structured populations have attracted considerable attention, originating from fields ranging from sociology to biology, ecology, economics, mathematics and physics, to name a few (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) . More recently, however, compelling evidence has been accumulated that a plethora of biological, social and technological real-world Networks of Contacts (NoC) are mostly heterogeneous (20) (21) (22) . Indeed, analysis of real-world NoC (20) has provided evidence for the following (heterogeneous) types: i) single-scale networks characterized by degree distributions (defined in the methods section) which exhibit a fast, typically Gaussian, decaying tail ii) broad-scale networks characterized by a power-law regime truncated, for large connectivities, by a fast decaying tail and iii)
scale-free networks characterized by a distribution that decays as a power-law. In Fig. 1 we show the distribution of connectivities associated with both single-scale and scale-free NoC, based on which the accepted 15-dec-2005 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences; published online 16-feb-2006 3 results shown in Figs. 2 and 3 were obtained. In order to better illustrate the degree of heterogeneity associated with each NoC, we show a double logarithmic plot of the cumulative degree distribution, defined in Fig. 1 . Clearly heterogeneity greatly increases as one moves all the way from single scale to extreme heterogeneous, scale-free NoC. In particular, the broad-scale NoC identified also in (20) exhibit tails which fall-off somewhere between the extreme limits depicted in Fig. 1 . All these different levels of heterogeneity stand in sharp contrast with homogeneous NoC. What is the impact of moving from a homogeneously structured population where everyone has the same amount of interactions to a heterogeneously structured population where some can interact more than others?
In particular, what is the impact of such more realistic NoC in the evolution of cooperation?
accepted 15-dec-2005 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences; published online 16-feb-2006 4 Here we address this problem by examining the emergence of cooperation in terms of the three popular and extensively studied dilemmas of cooperation referred above. It will be shown that increasing heterogeneity generally favours the emergence of cooperation, irrespective of the dilemma under investigation.
Games and Social Dilemmas
We shall model interactions among individuals in terms of two-person games, in which both players can either cooperate or defect when interacting with each other. Mutual cooperation leads to the reward R, (without loss of generality, we make R=1) whereas mutual defection leads to the punishment P (we make P=0 thereby normalizing the advantage of mutual cooperation over mutual defection to 1, in all games).
The other two possibilities occur whenever one player cooperates and the other defects, for which the associated game payoffs are S (sucker's payoff) and T (temptation) for the cooperator and the defector respectively. Provided that mutual cooperation is always preferred over mutual defection, the three dilemmas arise naturally (16) , depending on the relative ordering of these four payoffs: The Snowdrift game, for which T > 1 > S > 0, the Stag-Hunt game, for which 1 > T > 0 > S, and the Prisoner's Dilemma game, for which T > 1 > 0 > S. For all dilemmas, mutual cooperation is also preferred over unilateral cooperation (S) and over an equal probability of unilateral cooperation and defection (2 > T + S). Tension becomes apparent when the preferred choices of each player lead to individual actions resulting in mutual defection, in spite of the fact that mutual cooperation is more beneficial. Indeed, tension will arise whenever players prefer unilateral defection to mutual cooperation (T > 1), or players prefer mutual defection to unilateral cooperation (S < 0) or whenever both situations arise. This is precisely what happens in the Snowdrift game, the Stag-Hunt game and the Prisoner's Dilemma game respectively.
Formally, these dilemmas span a four-dimensional parameter space. By normalizing mutual cooperation to 1 and mutual defection to 0 we are left with two parameters, T and S. We study the behaviour of all dilemmas, summarized in Table 1 , in the ranges 0≤T≤2 and -1≤S≤1, which will be shown to be sufficient to characterize the games under study. Table 1 . Games studied and their parameter range. For each social dilemma studied, we list the corresponding abbreviation, the parameter range which we consider in this work and also the tension which leads to the dilemma. NoC. Indeed, whereas in homogenous NoC the answer to whether P D > P C relies exclusively on the relative ordering of the payoffs (T,R,P,S) , in heterogeneous NoC the answer depends now on the fact that N 1 ≠ N 2 .
In other words, the pattern of connectivity also contributes to define the accumulated payoff of each individual, a feature which, being natural, is absent in homogeneous NoC. Indeed, heterogeneity embeds the intuition that different individuals engage in different number of interactions with different intensity, which opens a new route to the evolution of cooperation: Cooperators will increase their fitness to the extent they succeed in maximizing their amount of cooperative interactions per generation. However, defectors may also increase their fitness by exploiting more cooperators per generation. The results presented as Supporting Information (SI) show that cooperators are able to profit from heterogeneity to outperform defectors.
Results and Discussion

Well-mixed populations
Before addressing heterogeneous, structured populations (results for homogeneous structured populations are provided as SI) we examine the effect of the dynamics on the finite population analogue to the infinite, well-mixed limit well-known from the standard analytical treatment (23): A complete, fully connected graph. Evolution is implemented via the stochastic dynamics described in the methods section.
As usual in evolutionary biology, the fitness of each individual is associated with the accumulated payoff Let us examine now the evolutionary dynamics in structured heterogeneous populations. We start with the single-scale type of populations identified in (20) , in which heterogeneity is small (Fig. 1) exhibiting a Gaussian tail for the degree-distribution. Finite populations exhibiting such features were generated using the configuration model (24) , which leads to random graphs compatible with a given degree-distribution ( The occurrence of many long-range connections (so-called shortcuts) in these graphs precludes the formation of compact clusters of cooperators, thereby facilitating invasion by defectors, whenever S<0.
However, the increase in heterogeneity of the NoC opens a new route for cooperation to emerge, since now different individuals interact different number of times per generation, which enables cooperators to outperform defectors. In other words, while on one hand the increased difficulty in aggregating clusters of cooperators would partially hamper cooperation (see SI), heterogeneity, on the other hand, counteracts this effect, with a net increase of cooperation. Indeed, the results discussed below for scale-free NoC show how cooperation is sensitive to the overall degree of heterogeneity of the underlying NoC, leading to an increase of cooperation as one evolves from homogeneous populations (Fig. 2 left panel) to extreme heterogeneous populations (Fig 3 below) . The effects of heterogeneity become indeed more prominent whenever we consider scale-free NoC ‡ ‡ .
The results for the evolution of cooperation in populations exhibiting a scale-free degree distribution such that all connections between individuals are purely random are shown in Fig.3 (left panel) . Notice that, in spite of the abundance of scale-free behaviour identified in real NoC, the detailed cartographic representation of the ties between individuals remains to a large extent unknown (25) . In this sense, random scale-free populations, generated in the way described in the methods section, provide a general ‡ ‡ In Ref. constitutes the major threat to cooperation.
The sustainability of cooperation, however, is not affected solely by the overall heterogeneity of the NoC associated with a given degree-distribution. In fact, it is particularly susceptible to the detailed and intricate ties between individuals in a population. Indeed, if we do not randomize the pattern of connectivity between individuals, such that the NoC exhibit the correlations arising naturally in the Barabási and Albert model, a different result emerges for the evolution of cooperation, as shown in Fig.3 (right panel). Under the presence of such correlations, the temptation to defect no more poses any threat to cooperation, defectors being wiped out from populations in the entire Snowdrift domain. In the Stag-Hunt domain, cooperators now wipe out defectors where before (Fig.3 , left panel) they managed to coexist. In the Prisoner's Dilemma domain, cooperators also get a strong foot-hold up to larger intensities of |S|.
As is well-known (21), the Barabási and Albert model exhibits so-called age-correlations, in which the older vertices not only become the ones acquiring highest connectivity, but also they become naturally interconnected with each other. These correlations result from the combined mechanisms of growth and preferential attachment which lie at the heart of the model (21) . As a result, the formation of compact clusters of cooperators which was inhibited by the occurrence of many shortcuts in random scale-free NoC, will be partly regained in such NoC, mostly for the few individuals which exhibit high connectivity.
Of course, such a clustering of cooperators will only occur to the extent that cooperators are able to occupy accepted 15-dec-2005 
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11 such highly connected sites, which indeed happens. The results shown in Fig.3 have the additional feature that the degree distributions of the NoC used in studying the evolution of cooperation actually coincide, the difference between the two NoC residing solely in the detailed pattern of ties between individuals.
Finally, we would like to point out that all our results remain unchanged both for larger (we have checked up to N=10 5 ) and also for smaller population sizes, down to values of approximately N=10 2 individuals.
For such small population sizes, stochastic effects resulting from both the graph generation procedures and the evolutionary dynamics preclude a clear-cut result for the evolution of cooperation.
Conclusions
The present results demonstrate that in more realistic, heterogeneous populations, the sustainability of cooperation is simpler to achieve than in homogeneous populations, a result which is valid irrespective of the dilemma adopted as a metaphor of cooperation. The results shown in Fig. 2 (right panel) show that heterogeneity constitutes a powerful mechanism for the emergence of cooperation, since even for mildly heterogeneous populations heterogeneity leads to sizeable effects in the evolution of cooperation. The results also show that the disadvantage of being defected (S<0) constitutes a stronger deterrent of cooperation than the temptation to defect (T>1), a feature found before for the Prisoner's Dilemma in the context of homogeneous, infinite populations (26) .
The overall enhancement of cooperation obtained on single-scale and scale-free graphs may be understood as resulting from the interplay of two mechanisms: i) The existence of many long-range connections in random and small-world NoC, which precludes the formation of compact clusters of cooperators; this effect acts to inhibit cooperation whenever S<0.
ii) The heterogeneity exhibited by these NoC, which opens a new route for cooperation to emerge and contributes to enhance cooperation (which increases with heterogeneity), counteracting the previous effect. The net result is that cooperation is enhanced, as shown in the right panel of Fig. 2 and in Fig. 3 .
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In this context it is noteworthy that the present model assumes a given population structure which remains immutable throughout evolution. A more realistic model, however, should take into account that individuals have the capacity to establish new links as well as to severe others throughout evolution, leading to an adaptive co-evolution of strategy and structure. It remains an open problem the extent to which such a possibility will naturally lead to the scale-free populations studied here.
Methods
Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Graphs. Fig. 1 we show the cumulative degree distribution associated with the heterogeneous types of NoC explicitly considered in this work (the cumulative degree distribution D(k) is defined in Fig. 1 ). Real-world NoC are clearly heterogeneous, corresponding to populations in which different individuals exhibit distinct patterns of connectivity, portraying the coexistence of local connections (spatial structure) with non-local connections (or shortcuts) and often exhibiting regions with a power-law dependence of their degree distributions (20) (21) (22) . Whenever heterogeneity is moderate, such that the connectivities of most individuals do not deviate significantly from the average connectivity value, the pattern of connectivity has been classified as "singlescale" in (20) , where it was found that such NoC typically exhibit a Gaussian tail. Those NoC exhibit cumulative degree distributions such as that illustrated in Fig. 1 with a dashed line. The results in Fig. 2 (right panel) correspond to populations modelled in terms of such types of NoC, generated making use of the configuration model (24) , which provides a maximally random graph compatible with such a degree , as shown in Fig. 1 with a solid line. The scale-free features of the Barabási-Albert model result from the combined effect of the two processes of Growth (28) and Preferential attachment (29) , the latter corresponding to the well-known "rich get richer" effect in economics (30), also known as the "Matthew effect" in sociology The role of heterogeneity in evolution may be singled out by removing any correlations (including age-correlations) in a graph. This is easily accomplished by exchanging, randomly and repeatedly, the ends of pairs of edges of the original graph (32), a procedure which washes out correlations without changing the degree-distribution (32) of the graphs. Results shown in Fig.3 (left panel) were obtained on Barabási-Albert scale-free NoC subsequently randomized in the way just described.
Evolutionary games on graphs.
For R=1, P=0, 0≤T≤2 and -1≤S≤1, evolution is carried out implementing the finite population analogue of replicator dynamics (18, 33) , to which simulation results converge in the limit of infinite complete graphs (well-mixed populations). This corresponds to define the following transition probabilities: In each life-cycle (one generation), all pairs of individuals x and y, directly connected, engage in a single round of the game, their accumulated payoff being stored as P x and P y , respectively. At the end of the generation, all strategies are updated simultaneously (synchronous updating). Whenever a site x is updated, a neighbour y is drawn at random among all k x neighbours; then, only if P y > P x the strategy of chosen neighbour y replaces that of x with probability given by . This denominator ensures a proper normalization of the transition probability (34) . The results obtained are robust and therefore insensitive to replacement of the previous expression by a transition probability function W(P y -P x ), being zero whenever P y ≤P x and increasing monotonously to 1 whenever P y >P x . We have also confirmed that replacing synchronous updating by asynchronous updating does not bring any qualitative modifications to the results presented here.
Simulations.
Simulations were carried out on graphs with N =10 4 vertices and average connectivity z=4 (except in Fig.2 left panel, where z=N-1). Equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and defectors were obtained, for each value of T and S, by averaging over 1000 generations after a transient time of 10000 generations (we confirmed that averaging over larger periods or using different transient times did not change the results).
Furthermore, final data results from averaging over 100 simulations, corresponding to 10 runs for each of 10 different realizations of a given type of NoC specified by the appropriate parameters (N and z). All simulations start with an equal percentage of strategies (cooperators and defectors) randomly distributed among the elements of the population. In this way, all vertices are initially populated with a strategy, and no initial advantage is given to cooperators or to defectors. Finally, even when graphs are generated stochastically, as is the case for the Barabási-Albert NoC, the evolution of cooperation is studied in full grown graphs, that is, the topology of the graph remains frozen throughout evolution.
Supporting Information
Homogeneous, structured populations
We may introduce spatial structure by restricting the amount of interactions of each individual to a few nearest neighbours (in our case, regular graphs with z=4), retaining the homogeneity of the population.
Using the results on complete graphs shown in Fig.1 (left panel) accepted 15-dec-2005 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences; published online 16-feb-2006 19 In the Snowdrift domain, it becomes easier for defectors to wipe out cooperators for large intensities of T>1, whenever S (>0) is small. Finally, in the Prisoner's Dilemma domain, cooperators are now able to outperform defectors for moderate intensities of both threats.
The role of spatial structure has been addressed before (11, 18, (35) (36) (37) , for the different dilemmas, and the results in Fig.S1 (left panel) reflect the intuition gained from previous work: Spatial structure allows the formation of compact clusters of cooperators, who in this way manage to resist invasion by defectors under both threats (Prisoner's Dilemma game). On the other hand, this effect is detrimental to cooperation (18) in the Snowdrift domain. The results of Fig.S1 also show clearly that spatial structure is most beneficial whenever mutual cooperation is undermined solely by the disadvantage of being cheated (Stag-Hunt game), a feature which suggests that, in homogeneous NoC, the individual rational choice of cooperators and defectors in a single interaction, according to a given dilemma, to a large extent allows one to understand the outcome of evolution, a feature which is no longer valid in heterogeneous NoC (see main text). Indeed, the best action of a given individual when confronted with a cooperator or a defector is very simple to identify whenever each of the threats are present separately (Snowdrift and Stag-Hunt game). In the case of the Snowdrift game it is best to defect whenever the opponent is a cooperator and to cooperate whenever the opponent is a defector. In the case of the Stag-Hunt game "you better stick together", since it is best to cooperate in front of a cooperator and to defect when the opponent is a defector. These 
Homogeneous, unstructured populations
The spatially structured graphs employed here may be viewed as highly correlated graphs, in the sense that the connectivity pattern is deterministically defined. It is quite simple, however to generate uncorrelated homogeneous graphs starting from regular graphs. Given a regular graph with average connectivity z and size N, we swap the ends of pairs of randomly chosen edges, for all pairs of edges, such that no duplicate connections arise. Since the edges are randomly chosen, by swapping the ends of each pair of edges one is actually introducing short-cuts in the original regular graph, in this way strongly affecting the properties of the associated network. As a result, and apart from their homogeneity, random homogeneous graphs exhibit small-world properties very similar to random graphs.
Taking into account the present results on spatially structured populations (represented by regular graphs for which z << N) it is clear that in random homogeneous NoC the capacity of cooperators to form compact clusters and resist invasion by defectors will be reduced. As a result, we expect that whenever 
